

Talking To Our Selves Reflection Ignorance And Agency

Getting the books Talking To Our Selves Reflection Ignorance And Agency now is not type of challenging means. You could not deserted going as soon as books increase or library or borrowing from your friends to entrance them. This is an definitely easy means to specifically get guide by on-line. This online statement Talking To Our Selves Reflection Ignorance And Agency can be one of the options to accompany you taking into account having extra time.

It will not waste your time. say you will me, the e-book will unconditionally express you other matter to read. Just invest little period to admission this on-line pronouncement Talking To Our Selves Reflection Ignorance And Agency as skillfully as evaluation them wherever you are now.

Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind T. Parent
2016-12-01 This volume attempts to solve a grave problem about critical self-reflection. The worry is that we critical thinkers are all in "epistemic bad faith" in light of what psychology tells us. After all, the research shows not merely that we are bad at detecting "ego-threatening" thoughts à la Freud. It also indicates that we are ignorant of even our ordinary thoughts—e.g., reasons for our moral judgments of others (Haidt 2001), and even mundane reasons for buying one pair of stockings over another! (Nisbett & Wilson 1977) However, reflection on one's thoughts requires knowing what those thoughts are in the first place. So if ignorance is the norm, why attempt self-reflection? The activity would just

display naivety about psychology. Yet while respecting all the data, this book argues that, remarkably, we are sometimes infallible in our self-discerning judgments. Even so, infallibility does not imply indubitability, and there is no Cartesian ambition to provide a "foundation" for empirical knowledge. The point is rather to explain how self-reflection as a rational activity is possible.

Good Lives Samuel Clark 2021-03-04 Reasoning with autobiography is a way to self-knowledge. We can learn about ourselves, as human beings and as individuals, by reading, thinking through, and arguing about this distinctive kind of text. Reasoning with Edmund Gosse's *Father and Son* is a way of learning about the nature of the good life and the roles that pleasure and self-

expression can play in it. Reasoning with Siegfried Sassoon's *Memoirs* is a way of learning about transformative experience, self-alienation, and therefore the nature of the self. *Good Lives: Autobiography, Self-Knowledge, Narrative, and Self-Realization* develops this claim by answering a series of questions: What is an autobiography? How can we learn about ourselves from reading one? On what subjects does autobiography teach? What should we learn about them? In particular, given that autobiographies are narratives, should we learn something about the importance of narrative in human life? Could our storytelling about our own lives make sense of them as wholes, unify them over time, or make them good for us? Could storytelling make the self? Samuel Clark provides an authoritative critique of narrative and a defence of a self-realization account of the self and its good. He investigates the wide range of extant accounts of the self and of the good life, and defends pluralist realism about self-knowledge by reading and reasoning with autobiographies of self-discovery, martial life, and solitude. The volume concludes by showing that autobiography can be reasoning in pursuit of self-knowledge; each of us is an unchosen, initially opaque, seedlike self; our good is the development and expression of our latent capacities, which is our individual self-realization; and self-narration plays much less role in our lives than some thinkers have supposed, and the

development and expression of potential much more.

[Lack of Character](#) John M. Doris 2002-08-15 This is a provocative contribution to contemporary ethical theory challenging foundational conceptions of character.

Talking to Our Selves John M. Doris 2015-03-19 John M. Doris presents a new account of agency and responsibility, which reconciles our understanding of ourselves as moral agents with psychological research on the unconscious mind. Much philosophical theorizing maintains that the exercise of morally responsible agency consists in judgment and behavior ordered by accurate reflection. On such theories, when human beings are able to direct their lives in the manner philosophers have dignified with the honorific 'agency', it's because they know what they're doing, and why they're doing it. This understanding is compromised by quantities of psychological research on unconscious processing, which suggests that accurate reflection is distressingly uncommon; very often behavior is ordered by surprisingly inaccurate self-awareness. Thus, if agency requires accurate reflection, people seldom exercise agency, and skepticism about agency threatens. To counter the skeptical threat, John M. Doris proposes an alternative theory that requires neither reflection nor accurate self-awareness: he identifies a dialogic form of agency where self-direction is

facilitated by exchange of the rationalizations with which people explain and justify themselves to one another. The result is a stoutly interdisciplinary theory sensitive to both what human beings are like—creatures with opaque and unruly psychologies—and what they need: an account of agency sufficient to support a practice of moral responsibility.

Scientism Jeroen de Ridder 2018-08-01 Can only science deliver genuine knowledge about the world and ourselves? Is science our only guide to what exists? Scientism answers both questions with yes. Scientism is increasingly influential in popular scientific literature and intellectual life in general, but philosophers have hitherto largely ignored it. This collection is one of the first to develop and assess scientism as a serious philosophical position. It features twelve new essays by both proponents and critics of scientism. Before scientism can be evaluated, it needs to be clear what it is. Hence, the collection opens with essays that provide an overview of the many different versions of scientism and their mutual interrelations. Next, several card-carrying proponents of scientism make their case, either by developing and arguing directly for their preferred version of scientism or by responding to objections. Then, the floor is given to critics of scientism. It is examined whether scientism is epistemically vicious, whether scientism presents a plausible general epistemological outlook and

whether science has limits. The final four essays zoom out and connect scientism to ongoing debates elsewhere in philosophy. What does scientism mean for religious epistemology? What can science tell us about morality and is a scientific moral epistemology plausible? How is scientism related to physicalism? And is experimental philosophy really a form of scientism tailored to philosophy?

The Reflective Life Valerie Tiberius 2010-03-25 How should you live? Should you devote yourself to perfecting a single talent or try to live a balanced life? Should you lighten up and have more fun, or buckle down and try to achieve greatness? Should you try to be a better friend? Should you be self-critical or self-accepting? And how should you decide among the possibilities open to you? Should you consult experts, listen to your parents, do lots of research? Make lists of pros and cons, or go with your gut? These are not questions that can be answered in general or in the abstract. Rather, these questions are addressed to the first person point of view, to the perspective each of us occupies when we reflect on how to live without knowing exactly what we're aiming for. To answer them, *The Reflective Life* focuses on the process of living one's life from the inside, rather than on defining goals from the outside. Drawing on traditional philosophical sources as well as literature and recent work in social psychology, Tiberius argues that, to live

well, we need to develop reflective wisdom: to care about things that will sustain us and give us good experiences, to have perspective on our successes and failures, and to be moderately self-aware and cautiously optimistic about human nature. Further, we need to know when to think about our values, character, and choices, and when not to. A crucial part of wisdom, Tiberius maintains, is being able to shift perspectives: to be self-critical when we are prepared for it, but not when it will undermine our success; to be realistic, but not to the extent that we are immobilized by the harsh facts of life; to examine life when reflection is appropriate, but not when we should lose ourselves in experience.

The Happiness Problem Wren-Lewis, Sam 2019-11-08 We appear to have more control over our lives than ever before. If we could get things right – the perfect job, relationship, family, body and mind – then we'd be happy. With enough economic growth and technological innovation, we could cure all societal ills. The Happiness Problem shows that this way of thinking is too simplistic and can even be harmful: no matter how much progress we make, we will still be vulnerable to disappointment, loss and suffering. The things we do to make us happy are merely the tip of the iceberg. Sam Wren-Lewis offers an alternative process that acknowledges insecurity and embraces uncertainty. Drawing on our psychological capacities for curiosity and

compassion, he proposes that we can connect with, and gain a deeper understanding of, the personal and social challenges that define our time

Sophie's World Jostein Gaarder 2007-03-20 One day Sophie comes home from school to find two questions in her mail: "Who are you?" and "Where does the world come from?" Before she knows it she is enrolled in a correspondence course with a mysterious philosopher. Thus begins Jostein Gaarder's unique novel, which is not only a mystery, but also a complete and entertaining history of philosophy.

The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason Ruth Chang 2020-12-30 Over the last several decades, questions about practical reason have come to occupy the center stage in ethics and metaethics. The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason is an outstanding reference source to this exciting and distinctive subject area and is the first volume of its kind. Comprising thirty-six chapters by an international team of contributors, the Handbook provides a comprehensive overview of the field and is divided into five parts: Foundational Matters Practical Reason in the History of Philosophy Philosophy of Practical Reason as Action Theory and Moral Psychology Philosophy of Practical Reason as Theory of Practical Normativity The Philosophy of Practical Reason as the Theory of Practical Rationality The Handbook also includes two chapters by the late

Derek Parfit, 'Objectivism about Reasons' and 'Normative Non-Naturalism.' The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason is essential reading for philosophy students and researchers in metaethics, philosophy of action, action theory, ethics, and the history of philosophy.

The Moral Psychology Handbook John M. Doris 2010-06-10 The Moral Psychology Handbook offers a survey of contemporary moral psychology, integrating evidence and argument from philosophy and the human sciences. The chapters cover major issues in moral psychology, including moral reasoning, character, moral emotion, positive psychology, moral rules, the neural correlates of ethical judgment, and the attribution of moral responsibility. Each chapter is a collaborative effort, written jointly by leading researchers in the field.

Fair Opportunity and Responsibility David O. Brink 2021-06 Brink analyzes responsibility and its relations to desert, culpability, excuse, blame, and punishment. He argues that an agent is responsible for misconduct if and only if it is not excused, and that responsibility consists in agents having suitable cognitive and volitional capacities, and a fair opportunity to exercise these capacities.

Ignorance of Law Douglas N. Husak 2016 This book argues that ignorance of law should usually be a complete excuse from criminal liability. It defends this conclusion by invoking two

presumptions: first, the content of criminal law should conform to morality; second, mistakes of fact and mistakes of law should be treated symmetrically. The author grounds his position in an underlying theory of moral and criminal responsibility according to which blameworthiness consists in a defective response to the moral reasons one has. Since persons cannot be faulted for failing to respond to reasons for criminal liability they do not believe they have, then ignorance should almost always excuse. But persons are somewhat responsible for their wrongs when their mistakes of law are reckless, that is, when they consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk that their conduct might be wrong. This book illustrates this with examples and critiques the arguments to the contrary offered by criminal theorists and moral philosophers. It assesses the real-world implications for the U.S. system of criminal justice. The author describes connections between the problem of ignorance of law and other topics in moral and legal theory.

Moral Acrobatics Philippe Roachat 2020-12-18 Although it is difficult for us to fathom, pure monsters do not exist. Terrorists and other serial killers massacre innocent people, yet are perfectly capable of loving their own parents, neighbors, and children. Hitler, sending millions to their death, was contemptuous of meat eaters and a strong advocate of animal welfare. How do we

reconcile such moral ambiguities? Do they capture something deep about how we build values? As a developmental scientist, Philippe Rochat explores this possibility, proposing that as members of a uniquely symbolic and self-conscious species aware of its own mortality, we develop uncanny abilities toward lying and self-deception. We are deeply categorical and compartmentalized in our views of the world. We imagine essence where there is none. We juggle double standards and manage contradictory values, clustering our existence depending on context and situations, whether we deal in relation to close kin, colleagues, strangers, lovers, or enemies. We live within multiple, interchangeable moral spheres. This social-contextual determination of the moral domain is the source of moral ambiguities and blatant contradictions we all need to own up to.

Discourse on the Origin of Inequality Jean-Jacques Rousseau 2018-03-25 Rousseau first exposes in *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* his conception of a human state of nature, presented as a philosophical fiction and of human perfectibility, an early idea of progress. He then explains the way, according to him, people may have established civil society, which leads him to present private property as the original source and basis of all inequality. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712 – 1778) was a Genevan philosopher, writer, and composer of the 18th

century, mainly active in France. His political philosophy influenced the Enlightenment across Europe, as well as aspects of the French Revolution and the overall development of modern political and educational thought.

Ethics for A-Level Mark Dimmock 2017-07-31

What does pleasure have to do with morality? What role, if any, should intuition have in the formation of moral theory? If something is 'simulated', can it be immoral? This accessible and wide-ranging textbook explores these questions and many more. Key ideas in the fields of normative ethics, metaethics and applied ethics are explained rigorously and systematically, with a vivid writing style that enlivens the topics with energy and wit. Individual theories are discussed in detail in the first part of the book, before these positions are applied to a wide range of contemporary situations including business ethics, sexual ethics, and the acceptability of eating animals. A wealth of real-life examples, set out with depth and care, illuminate the complexities of different ethical approaches while conveying their modern-day relevance. This concise and highly engaging resource is tailored to the Ethics components of AQA Philosophy and OCR Religious Studies, with a clear and practical layout that includes end-of-chapter summaries, key terms, and common mistakes to avoid. It should also be of practical use for those teaching Philosophy as part of the International

Baccalaureate. Ethics for A-Level is of particular value to students and teachers, but Fisher and Dimmock's precise and scholarly approach will appeal to anyone seeking a rigorous and lively introduction to the challenging subject of ethics.

Tailored to the Ethics components of AQA Philosophy and OCR Religious Studies.

The Limits of Sociality Johnna B. McGovern 2019

There is a longstanding tradition in Western philosophy of emphasizing the capacity for reflection in theories about humans' characteristic nature. In *Talking to Ourselves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency*, John Doris attempts to shift the focus to an emphasis on human sociality.

Particularly, Doris argues that sociality, both implicitly and in the form of collaborative reasoning, is what makes humans best equipped for moral improvement. This collaborativism possesses a defining role in his account of agency and responsibility. This thesis attempts to gain an understanding of how sociality affects moral behavior and to argue that it is not conducive to agency in the way that Doris hypothesizes. The paper advances in three stages. First, I provide an exegesis of what I take to be the three foundational aspects of Doris' account of agency and responsibility: value-expressive behavior, collaborativism and currentism. I surmise that if values, the agency-grounding inner state, are deeply historical and unshakeable, they fail to be expressive of self-

direction. For Doris, sociality should be a means for revision by helping individuals to better determine what they should value and how to express those values in their behavior. In the second section, I introduce the norms literature to argue that (1) sociality inculcates individuals with highly consistent sets of values through mechanisms for norm acquisition. In the third section, I argue that (2) sociality does not have an easy route to revising those acquired sets of values due to confirmation bias, the strength of our moral convictions and the difficulties these factors raise for individuals recognizing and resolving moral dilemmas. I conclude that because (1) and (2) are the case, values are not self-directed in the way agency requires.

Accordingly, Doris' currentist, collaborativist, valuational account of agency and responsibility is in need of substantial revision, or amendment.

The Practice of Everyday Life Provides Supporters and Inviters of Morally Responsible Agency. In Response To: Précis of Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency Jörg Zinken 2018

Autonomy Beate Roessler 2021-05-18 In everyday life, we generally assume that we can make our own decisions on matters which concern our own lives. We assume that a life followed only according to decisions taken by other people, against our will, cannot be a well-lived life – we assume, in other words, that we

are and should be autonomous. However, it is equally true that many aspects of our lives are not chosen freely: this is true of social relations and commitments but also of all those situations we simply seem to stumble into, situations which just seem to happen to us. The possibility of both the success of an autonomous life and its failure are part of our everyday experiences. In this brilliant and illuminating book, Beate Roessler examines the tension between failing and succeeding to live an autonomous life and the obstacles we have to face when we try to live our life autonomously, obstacles within ourselves as well as those that stem from social and political conditions. She highlights the ambiguities we encounter, examines the roles of self-awareness and self-deception, explores the role of autonomy for the meaning of life, and maps out the social and political conditions necessary for autonomy. Informed by philosophical perspectives but also drawing on literary texts, such as those of Siri Hustvedt and Jane Austen, and diaries, including those of Franz Kafka and Sylvia Plath, Roessler develops a formidable defense of autonomy against excessive expectations and, above all, against overpowering skepticism.

The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence
Berit Brogaard 2020-12-22 This book collects original essays by top scholars that address questions about the nature, origins, and effects of ambivalence. While the nature of agency has

received an enormous amount of attention, relatively little has been written about ambivalence or how it relates to topics such as agency, rationality, justification, knowledge, autonomy, self-governance, well-being, social cognition, and various other topics. Ambivalence presents unique questions related to many major philosophical debates. For example, it relates to debates about virtues, rationality, and decision-making, agency or authenticity, emotions, and social or political metacognition. It is also relevant to a variety of larger debates in philosophy and psychology, including nature vs. nature, objectivity vs. subjectivity, or nomothetic vs. idiographic. The essays in this book offer novel and wide-ranging perspectives on this emerging philosophical topic. They will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in ethics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, and social cognition.

Conversation Analysis Rebecca Clift 2016-09-08

The first linguistics-based textbook on conversation analysis, illuminating the universals of interaction across a rich array of languages.

[Democracy and Education](#) John Dewey 1916

John Dewey's *Democracy and Education* addresses the challenge of providing quality public education in a democratic society. In this classic work Dewey calls for the complete renewal of public education, arguing for the fusion of vocational and contemplative studies in

education and for the necessity of universal education for the advancement of self and society. First published in 1916, *Democracy and Education* is regarded as the seminal work on public education by one of the most important scholars of the century.

Belief and Truth Katja Maria Vogt 2012-08-08

Katja Maria Vogt's *Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato* explores a Socratic intuition about the difference between belief and knowledge. Beliefs -- doxai -- are deficient cognitive attitudes. In believing something, one accepts some content as true without knowing that it is true; one holds something to be true that could turn out to be false. Since our actions reflect what we hold to be true, holding beliefs is potentially harmful for oneself and others. Accordingly, beliefs are ethically worrisome and even, in the words of Plato's Socrates, "shameful." As Vogt argues, this is a serious philosophical proposal and it speaks to intuitions we are likely to share. But it involves a notion of belief that is rather different from contemporary notions. Today, it is a widespread assumption that true beliefs are better than false beliefs, and that some true beliefs (perhaps those that come with justifications) qualify as knowledge. Socratic epistemology offers a genuinely different picture. In aiming for knowledge, one must aim to get rid of beliefs. Knowledge does not entail belief -- belief and knowledge differ in such important

ways that they cannot both count as kinds of belief. As long as one does not have knowledge, one should reserve judgment and investigate by thinking through possible ways of seeing things. According to Vogt, the ancient skeptics and Stoics draw many of these ideas from Plato's dialogues, revising Socratic-Platonic arguments as they see fit. *Belief and Truth* retraces their steps through interpretations of the *Apology*, *Ion*, *Republic*, *Theaetetus*, and *Philebus*, reconstructs Pyrrhonian investigation and thought, and illuminates the connections between ancient skepticism and relativism, as well as the Stoic view that beliefs do not even merit the evaluations "true" and "false."

Our Minds, Our Selves Keith Oatley 2018-04-10

An original history of psychology told through the stories of its most important breakthroughs and the people who made them *Advances in psychology* have revolutionized our understanding of the human mind. Imaging technology allows researchers to monitor brain activity, letting us see what happens when we perceive, think, and feel. But technology is only part of how ideas about the mind and brain have developed over the past century and a half. In *Our Minds, Our Selves*, distinguished psychologist and writer Keith Oatley provides an engaging, original, and authoritative history of modern psychology told through the stories of its most important breakthroughs and the men and women who

made them. *Our Minds, Our Selves* traverses a fascinating terrain: forms of conscious and unconscious knowledge; brain physiology; emotion; stages of mental development from infancy to adulthood; language acquisition and use; the nature of memory; mental illness; morality; free will; creativity; the mind at work in art and literature; and, most important, our ability to cooperate with one another. Controversial experiments—such as Stanley Milgram's investigation of our willingness to obey authority and inflict pain and Philip Zimbardo and his colleagues' study of behavior in a simulated prison—are covered in detail. Biographical sketches illuminate the thinkers behind key insights and turning points: historical figures such as Hermann Helmholtz, Charles Darwin, Sigmund Freud, Jean Piaget, B. F. Skinner, and Alan Turing; leading contemporaries such as Geoffrey Hinton, Michael Tomasello, and Tania Singer; and influential people from other fields, including Margaret Mead, Noam Chomsky, Jane Goodall, and Gabrielle Starr. Enhancing our understanding of ourselves and others, psychology holds the potential to create a better world. *Our Minds, Our Selves* tells the story of this most important of sciences in a new and appealing way.

[The Allegory of the Cave](#) Plato 2021-01-08 The Allegory of the Cave, or Plato's Cave, was presented by the Greek philosopher Plato in his work *Republic* (514a–520a) to compare "the

effect of education (ἡ παιδεία) and the lack of it on our nature". It is written as a dialogue between Plato's brother Glaucon and his mentor Socrates, narrated by the latter. The allegory is presented after the analogy of the sun (508b–509c) and the analogy of the divided line (509d–511e). All three are characterized in relation to dialectic at the end of Books VII and VIII (531d–534e). Plato and Socrates describe a group of people who have lived chained to the wall of a cave all of their lives, facing a blank wall. The people watch shadows projected on the wall from objects passing in front of a fire behind them, and give names to these shadows. The shadows are the prisoners' reality.

[Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge](#) Therese Scarpelli Cory 2013-11-07 A study of Aquinas's theory of self-knowledge, situated within the mid-thirteenth-century debate and his own maturing thought on human nature.

[Talking to Our Selves](#) John M. Doris 2015-03-19 John M. Doris presents a new account of agency and responsibility, which reconciles our understanding of ourselves as moral agents with psychological research on the unconscious mind. Much philosophical theorizing maintains that the exercise of morally responsible agency consists in judgment and behavior ordered by accurate reflection. On such theories, when human beings are able to direct their lives in the manner philosophers have dignified with the honorific

'agency', it's because they know what they're doing, and why they're doing it. This understanding is compromised by quantities of psychological research on unconscious processing, which suggests that accurate reflection is distressingly uncommon; very often behavior is ordered by surprisingly inaccurate self-awareness. Thus, if agency requires accurate reflection, people seldom exercise agency, and skepticism about agency threatens. To counter the skeptical threat, John M. Doris proposes an alternative theory that requires neither reflection nor accurate self-awareness: he identifies a dialogic form of agency where self-direction is facilitated by exchange of the rationalizations with which people explain and justify themselves to one another. The result is a stoutly interdisciplinary theory sensitive to both what human beings are like—creatures with opaque and unruly psychologies—and what they need: an account of agency sufficient to support a practice of moral responsibility.

Bad Beliefs Neil Levy 2021-12-31 This book challenges the view that bad beliefs - beliefs that blatantly conflict with easily available evidence - can largely be explained by widespread irrationality, instead arguing that ordinary people are rational agents whose beliefs are the result of their rational response to the evidence they're presented with.

Character Trouble John M. Doris 2021-11-11

John M. Doris has been a leading proponent of interdisciplinary approaches to moral psychology since their rise to prominence in the 1990's. His work has helped foster a methodological reorientation in the field, and has had a transformative effect on the way philosophers approach questions of character, virtue, and agency. This volume collects a selection of Doris' work spanning 20 years, focusing on the ways in which human personality orders (and fails to order) moral cognition and behaviour. It also presents two new chapters, which together form an in-depth assessment of recent developments in the moral psychology of character, as well as a closing commentary outlining methodological recommendations for those aspiring to do empirically responsible moral psychology. Together, these works present a distinctive vision of moral psychology which will engage both philosophers and psychologists.

Talking to Our Selves John Michael Doris 2015

Do we know what we're doing, and why?

Psychological research seems to suggest not: reflection and self-awareness are surprisingly uncommon and inaccurate. John M. Doris presents a new account of agency and responsibility, which reconciles our understanding of ourselves as moral agents with empirical work on the unconscious mind.

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

David Hume 2016-11-10 Moral philosophy, or the

science of human nature, may be treated after two different manners; each of which has its peculiar merit, and may contribute to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of mankind. The one considers man chiefly as born for action; and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment; pursuing one object, and avoiding another, according to the value which these objects seem to possess, and according to the light in which they present themselves. As virtue, of all objects, is allowed to be the most valuable, this species of philosophers paint her in the most amiable colours; borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their subject in an easy and obvious manner, and such as is best fitted to please the imagination, and engage the affections. They select the most striking observations and instances from common life; place opposite characters in a proper contrast; and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory and happiness, direct our steps in these paths by the soundest precepts and most illustrious examples. They make us feel the difference between vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our sentiments; and so they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honour, they think, that they have fully attained the end of all their labours.

Self-Control W. L. Tiemeijer 2022-08-31 Good self-control is a crucial factor in the distribution of life outcomes, ranging from success at school

and work, to good mental and physical health, and to satisfying romantic relationships. While in the last decades psychologists have learned much about this all-important trait, both social theory and politics have not caught up. Many academics and policymakers still seem to believe that everybody has unlimited capacity for self-control and that maintaining discipline is purely a matter of volition. This book shows that such beliefs are fundamentally mistaken. It presents the state-of-the-art in research on self-control, explains why this trait has been largely overlooked, and sets out the profound implications of this psychological research for moral responsibility, distributive justice and public policy. It shows that the growing emphasis in politics on 'personal responsibility' is deeply problematic, and outlines alternatives more in accord with human psychology.

[A Theory of Justice](#) John RAWLS 2009-06-30

Though the revised edition of *A Theory of Justice*, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition. This reissue makes the first edition once again available for scholars and serious students of Rawls's work.

The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology Manuel Vargas 2022 *The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology* is a comprehensive, multidisciplinary, state-of-the-art overview of moral psychology. The

50 chapters, written by leading figures in both philosophy and psychology, cover many of the most important topics in the field and form the definitive survey of contemporary moral psychology.

Advances in Research, Theory and Practice in Work-Integrated Learning Sonia J. Ferns

2021-09-30 Work-integrated learning (WIL) is a key strategy for enhancing student employability outcomes and lifelong learning capabilities. This timely publication critically reflects on existing scholarship and practice in WIL, discusses contemporary insights, provides a synopsis of resonating themes, and recommends areas for future research and practice. The book aims to position WIL as a strategic imperative for enabling a sustainable workforce through strengthening graduate capacity both in Australia and globally. The collection of edited scholarly chapters were compiled by 59 researchers, practitioners, and experts in WIL, and supported by the peak national professional body for WIL in Australia, the Australian Collaborative Education Network (ACEN). The chapters cover a range of pertinent topics such as teaching and learning, stakeholder engagement, maximizing learning outcomes, diverse forms of WIL practice, support and infrastructure, and future directions. Specific areas of interest include governance and leadership, student equity and wellbeing, quality and evaluation and interdisciplinary WIL. This

book is essential reading for researchers, practitioners, workplace and community partners, university leaders, and policy makers, as the practice of WIL continues to expand in the higher education sector.

Minding the Gap Karen Stohr 2019 "The book is an exploration of how we narrow the gap between our moral ideals and our actual selves. It develops an account of moral improvement as a practical project requiring a good moral neighborhood. Moral neighborhoods are constructed through social practices that instantiate moral ideals in a flawed world"--

Knowledge and Ignorance of Self in Platonic Philosophy James M. Ambury 2018-12-31 The only available volume of essays from scholars of every interpretative viewpoint on self-knowledge and self-ignorance in Plato's thought.

Self-Knowledge for Humans Quassim Cassam 2014-11-27 Human beings are not model epistemic citizens. Our reasoning can be careless and uncritical, and our beliefs, desires, and other attitudes aren't always as they ought rationally to be. Our beliefs can be eccentric, our desires irrational and our hopes hopelessly unrealistic. Our attitudes are influenced by a wide range of non-epistemic or non-rational factors, including our character, our emotions, and powerful unconscious biases. Yet we are rarely conscious of such influences. Self-ignorance is not something to which human beings are immune. In

this book Quassim Cassam develops an account of self-knowledge which tries to do justice to these and other respects in which humans aren't model epistemic citizens. He rejects rationalist and other mainstream philosophical accounts of self-knowledge on the grounds that, in more than one sense, they aren't accounts of self-knowledge for humans. Instead he defends the view that inferences from behavioural and psychological evidence are a basic source of human self-knowledge. On this account, self-knowledge is a genuine cognitive achievement and self-ignorance is almost always on the cards. As well as explaining knowledge of our own states of mind, Cassam also accounts for what he calls 'substantial' self-knowledge, including knowledge of our values, emotions, and character. He criticizes philosophical accounts of self-knowledge for neglecting substantial self-knowledge, and concludes with a discussion of the value of self-knowledge. This book tries to do for philosophy what behavioural economics tries to do for economics. Just as behavioural economics is the economics of homo sapiens, as distinct from the economics of an ideally rational and self homo economics, so Cassam argues that philosophy should focus on the human predicament rather than on the reasoning and self-knowledge of an idealized homo philosophicus.

Phenomenology as Qualitative Research John Paley 2016-08-12 Phenomenology originated as a

novel way of doing philosophy early in the twentieth century. In the writings of Husserl and Heidegger, regarded as its founders, it was a non-empirical kind of philosophical enquiry. Although this tradition has continued in a variety of forms, 'phenomenology' is now also used to denote an empirical form of qualitative research (PQR), especially in health, psychology and education. However, the methods adopted by researchers in these disciplines have never been subject to detailed critical analysis; nor have the methods advocated by methodological writers who are regularly cited in the research literature. This book examines these methods closely, offering a detailed analysis of worked-through examples in three influential textbooks by Giorgi, van Manen, and Smith, Flowers and Larkin. Paley argues that the methods described in these texts are radically under-specified, and suggests alternatives to PQR as an approach to qualitative research, particularly the use of interview data in the construction of models designed to explain phenomena rather than merely describe or interpret them. This book also analyses, and aims to develop, the implicit theory of 'meaning' found in PQR writings. The author establishes an account of 'meaning' as an inference marker, and explores the methodological implications of this view. This book evaluates the methods used in phenomenology-as-qualitative-research, and formulates a more fully theorised alternative. It

will appeal to researchers and students in the areas of health, nursing, psychology, education, public health, sociology, anthropology, political science, philosophy and logic.

Anger and Forgiveness Martha C. Nussbaum

2016-04-01 Anger is not just ubiquitous, it is also popular. Many people think it is impossible to care sufficiently for justice without anger at injustice. Many believe that it is impossible for individuals to vindicate their own self-respect or to move beyond an injury without anger. To not feel anger in those cases would be considered suspect. Is this how we should think about anger, or is anger above all a disease, deforming both the personal and the political? In this wide-ranging book, Martha C. Nussbaum, one of our leading public intellectuals, argues that anger is conceptually confused and normatively pernicious. It assumes that the suffering of the wrongdoer restores the thing that was damaged, and it betrays an all-too-lively interest in relative status and humiliation. Studying anger in intimate relationships, casual daily interactions, the workplace, the criminal justice system, and movements for social transformation, Nussbaum shows that anger's core ideas are both infantile and harmful. Is forgiveness the best way of transcending anger? Nussbaum examines different conceptions of this much-sentimentalized notion, both in the Jewish and Christian traditions and in secular morality. Some forms of

forgiveness are ethically promising, she claims, but others are subtle allies of retribution: those that exact a performance of contrition and abasement as a condition of waiving angry feelings. In general, she argues, a spirit of generosity (combined, in some cases, with a reliance on impartial welfare-oriented legal institutions) is the best way to respond to injury. Applied to the personal and the political realms, Nussbaum's profoundly insightful and erudite view of anger and forgiveness puts both in a startling new light.

Time in Action Carla Bagnoli 2022-03-25

This book explores the role of time in rational agency and practical reasoning. Agents are finite and often operate under severe time constraints. Action takes time and unfolds in time. While time is an ineliminable constituent of our experience of agency, it is both a theoretical and a practical problem to explain whether and how time shapes rational agency and practical thought. The essays in this book are divided into three parts. Part I is devoted to the temporal structure of action and agency, from metaphysical and metaethical perspectives. Part II features essays about the temporal structure of rational deliberation, from the perspective of action theory and theories of practical reasoning. Part III includes essays about the temporal aspects of failures of rationality. Taken together, the essays in this book shed new light on our understanding of the temporality of

agency that coheres with our subjective sense of finitude and explains rational agency both in time and over time. Time in Action will be of interest to

advanced students and researchers working on the philosophy of time, metaphysics of action, action theory, practical reasoning, ethical theory, moral psychology, and rational justification.